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ral Histories represent the recol-
lections and opinions of the per-
son interviewed, and not the
official position of MORS. Omissions
and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort has been made
to present Vice Admiral Tracey’s own
words.
Vice Admiral Patricia A. Tracey was
Chief of Naval Education and Training
from June 1996 to December 1998. She
was the first female to achieve the rank
of Vice Admiral in the US Navy and while
on active duty was the Navy’s highest-
ranking female naval officer. Vice Admiral
Tracey graduated with distinction earning
a master of science degree in operations
research (OR) from the Naval Postgradu-
ate School (NPS) in 1980, with Captain
Wayne Hughes, FS, as her thesis advisor.
She retired from the Navy in October
2004. She retired from Hewlett Packard
Enterprises in October 2016 as Vice Presi-
dent of Homeland Security and Defense,
and continues to serve on the boards of
directors of US Steel and Armed Forces
Benefits Association. This interview was
conducted by Dr. Sheldon on June 29,
2016, at HP Enterprises in Herndon, Vir-
ginia, with Dr. Brown and Captain Hughes
joining via telephone.
FOREWORD
By Wayne Hughes, FS
LCDR Patricia Tracey was my first
thesis student in 1980 and she set a high
bar for the many students I advised later.
After she graduated, I followed Pat’s ca-
reer with growing admiration for her en-
ergy, perspicacity, and devotion to quality
wherever she served. Operations research
was the best curriculum she could have
taken for the objective decision making
that characterizes her many years of ser-
vice. But I agree with what she saw when
she was Chief of Naval Education and
Training (CNET)—that at NPS the OR
skills had been diffused into other curric-
ula, like space systems, undersea warfare,
systems engineering analysis, information
science, and electronic warfare, and those
programs are also suitable preparation for
a young officer.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Vice Admiral Patricia
A. Tracey; Dr. Jerry Brown, CaptainWayne
Hughes, FS, and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS,
Interviewers.
Bob Sheldon: First of all, can you give us
your parents’ names and tell us where you
were born?
Pat Tracey: Bill and Dorothy Tracey. I
was born in the Bronx in New York City.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about your parents
and how they influenced you.
Pat Tracey: My parents had three girls
and they had only one objective for all three
girls: that we would finish college. We were
the first in our family to finish college. That
was probably the largest influence they had,
in terms of my education. They had spent
three years in the Army Air Corps in World
War II, and they remembered it as the three
years they most valued in their lives as
a young married couple. That influenced
my interest in joining the military. Actually,
I looked at the Air Force first before I chose
the Navy. Their experiences matched what
mine were, with regard to the quality of
the people and the quality of experience.
So what I started out to do for two years,
I ended up doing for 34.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about what they did
in the Army Air Corps.
Pat Tracey: I have no clue. My dad was
stationed in Meridian, Mississippi, and Bir-
mingham, Alabama, and never went over-
seas. They were native New Yorkers, so
going to the Deep South was an interesting
cultural experience for them. But they were
always quite positive about that experience.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to ele-
mentary, junior high, and high school?
Pat Tracey: I went to all Catholic schools. I
went to elementary school in the Bronx at
a place called Immaculate Conception. I went
to the Academy of Mount St. Ursula, which
was an all-girls academy that my mother had
attended, and she sent all three of her daugh-
ters there. And then I went to the College of
New Rochelle, in New Rochelle, New York.
Bob Sheldon: How did you choose your
college?
Pat Tracey: It was the college thatwas as-
sociated with the prep school I went to.
Bob Sheldon:Did you take an early inter-
est in math or science?
Pat Tracey: Math and languages were
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major when I went to college, mostly because
you didn’t have to write papers.
Bob Sheldon:Did you focus on any particular
area of mathematics in your undergraduate
studies?
Pat Tracey:No. It was a liberal arts math de-
gree, so it was pretty broad.
Bob Sheldon: When did you start college?
Pat Tracey: I started college in 1966 and
graduated in 1970 with a bachelor of arts degree
in math.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of job were you
looking for when you graduated from college?
Pat Tracey: I intended to join the Navy, and I
did that. I had intended to join the Navy for two
years; there was a program for women college
graduates to become line officers and serve for
two years active and four years reserve after
that. That was a perfect fit for me in my mind.
I was graduating young. I was 19 when I grad-
uated; I’d be 21 at the end of my active duty ser-
vice. I thought I’d actually know what I wanted
to do at the end of two years, and that was the
reason I chose that course.
Bob Sheldon: You graduated from college at
the age of 19, so you must have graduated from
high school at the age of 15. How did you man-
age that?
Pat Tracey: I was fortunate to skip a grade
twice in elementary school, completing 3rd
and 4th grade in one year, and later 7th and 8th.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned that your par-
ents had been in the Army Air Corps. What mo-
tivated you to join the Navy?
Pat Tracey: The mission, the locations, the
uniform. Once I actually began training at
Women Officers School in the summer of 1969,
it became clear that the Navy was actually
ahead of the Air Force and Army in expanding
assignment opportunities for women.
Bob Sheldon:Where did you go for your offi-
cer training?
Pat Tracey: Women Officers School in New-
port, Rhode Island. Iwas a 1970 commissioned of-
ficer. Women could not attend Officer Candidate
School (OCS), Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC), or the service academies then. I went to
a thing called Women Officers School. It was
a whole lot like the Catholic girls’ school, but it
was quite effective at building a culture of excel-
lence and commitment to the Navy’s mission.
Bob Sheldon: How did you find it? Was it
regimented, physically challenging?
Pat Tracey: Yes, it was very similar to my un-
dergraduate experience in terms of discipline—
very regimented. We wore uniforms; I didn’t
wear those in college.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have plans for what
you wanted to do in the fleet in the Navy?
Pat Tracey: Remember, in 1970 women could
not go to sea, so it was going to be a shore duty as-
signment. I knew what I did not want to do: I
didn’t want to be a personnel officer; I did not
want to work in training; and I did not want to
work in an administrative role. And I was quite
fortunate. I was assigned as a satellite surveillance
officer at the Naval Space Surveillance Center
(NAVSPASUR). It was one of theNorthAmerican
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Space
Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) net-
work sensors located in Dahlgren, Virginia.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you there?
Pat Tracey: I was there for three and a half
years.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of things did you
do there?
Pat Tracey: We stood a 24-by-7 watch.
NAVSPASUR ran a fixed detection fence across
the southern part of the United States, tracked
everything that came through that fence, and
built predictive orbits for those items that came
through the fence in order to be able to detect
anomalies. There were 15 officers assigned and
more than 100 civilians. The 15 officers stood
24-by-7 satellite surveillance officer watch and
fed data to NORAD for further use in intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) detection. The
civilian analysts developed a set of tools that
the fleet used to predict the presence of recon-
naissance satellites overhead, so they could shut
down targeted operations when those time
frames occurred. And we would generate the
message traffic to send to the fleet as new de-
vices were launched. In my daytime job, I was
responsible for tracking and building predictive
orbits on items that were not identified with
a specific satellite—often debris from broken
up satellites—space junk if youwill. I had the re-
sponsibility to track those and build orbits for
them over time.
Bob Sheldon: Did the Navy send you to tech-
nical training before you went to that job?
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Pat Tracey: No. NAVSPASUR ran a watch
qualification training process and then the ci-
vilian workforce provided on-the-job training
(OJT) for our daytime duties.
Bob Sheldon: Did that involve somebody
mentoring you and teaching you how to do
that?
Pat Tracey: Actually, this is a fascinating
command. It was 100 or so civilians, most of
them 1950s, early 1960s Air Force personnel,
about 50 percent of them holding bachelors
and graduate degrees. A lot of them were self-
taught, and they built the most precise predic-
tive software in the SPADAT network. The
Navy’s data was more reliable than any other
network node could produce on satellite sur-
veillance, and the solutions were built by that
command. They were actually pretty fascinat-
ing folks.
My first day on duty, I walked in and there
were these thermal papers rolling down the pas-
sageway, and all these people crawling on their
hands and knees, circling things with different
colored pens. What happened was the com-
puter system had been struck by lightning and
had gone down. And the Chinese had launched
their second satellite just before that happened,
and a Soviet satellite had broken up as it
was coming through the network, so it had
created thousands of unidentified objects com-
ing through the fence. They couldn’t wait for
the computer system to come back up again to
start working on what the orbit predictions
were for those devices, because they weren’t
sure what the Chinese had launched. So they
were doing hand calculations of orbits based
on analog data—something that was normally
done by the digital system—they were able to
do it by hand. It was actually pretty fascinating.
Bob Sheldon: Did you use differential equa-
tions to solve that?
Pat Tracey: Yes, this was physics and celes-
tial mechanics more than it was calculus. And
let me tell you that every time I’ve taken one
of those courses, I came as close to failing the
course as possible. This was a group of people
that taught everybody who was assigned there
a lot, both how to do that sort of math and
how to use the computer systems and build ad-
ditional programming. (I learned computer pro-
gramming while I was at Dahlgren.) And just
the commitment to the mission—that mission
was so important in their minds that if they
had to build these orbits by hand, they were go-
ing to do it. I learned early a respect for the civil-
ians who serve in the Department of Defense
(DoD) —that they’re just as committed as the
people in uniform are to the mission.
Bob Sheldon: For the benefit of the geeks in
our readership, what programming language
did you use?
Pat Tracey: FORTRAN.
Bob Sheldon: Wayne Hughes will appreciate
that.
Wayne Hughes: That’s my time.
Jerry Brown: I’m getting misty-eyed hearing
this.
Bob Sheldon: That assignment lasted three
years, and you had thought about getting out
of the Navy. What convinced you to stay?
Pat Tracey: I really liked the people. I really
didn’t know what else I wanted to do. And I
was offered orders to London, to go to the
Worldwide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCCS) site in London. That was
pretty exciting. Dahlgren was a town that
existed only because of the military base
there—a huge contrast to growing up in New
YorkCity. I arrived therewithout a car andwith-
out a driver’s license. I had never lived any-
where where it got dark at night. Dahlgren
had not been exactly the world experience I ex-
pected in joining the Navy. London sounded
fascinating. I accepted those orders. They were
canceled at the last minute. I was sent toHawaii,
but I had already made the decision to stay in
uniform by that time. I went to Hawaii to the
only job I ever disliked my entire time in the
Navy.
Bob Sheldon: What was that job?
Pat Tracey: You may not remember this, but
there was—still is, I think—a piece of legislation
called the Brooks Bill that requires that any data
processing equipment procurement be fully jus-
tified in a business case analysis, that is struc-
tured in the DoD Instruction. There’s only one
way to do the analysis, and it compares pro-
curement options—buying versus leasing versus
not doing anything at all.My jobwas to run those
analyses for subordinates of the commander-
in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. This was from
1973 to 1975. I got to tell the commander of
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . PATRICIA A. TRACEY
Military Operations Research, V22 N1 2017 Page 61
the submarine force in the Pacific that he did not
have a business case for buying Wang com-
puters to do fire control solutions on his subma-
rines, because it didn’t meet the analytics in this
predetermined prescribed formula. The policy
left no room for an evaluation informed by
a warfighter’s point of view and experience. It
was the most frustrating job I had in the Navy,
the only one I actually didn’t like, because we
were clearly lagging behind the times, just as
microcomputers were coming into being. We
were looking at this as if it was proliferating
keypunch operators.
Bob Sheldon: You were a Lieutenant then?
Pat Tracey: Yes, I was a Lieutenant.
Bob Sheldon: How long did you stay in that
job?
Pat Tracey: Two years.
Bob Sheldon: And you were eager to get out
of that.What kinds of jobswere you looking for?
Pat Tracey: I wanted to go back to a technical
job. I was supposed to when I was sent to
Hawaii. I was supposed to help the Pacific Fleet
implement the computer program that we had
built to forecast satellite overhead times. It had
been built to run on a mainframe in Dahlgren,
and then we were exporting versions of it to
the fleet so the fleet could run it at sea, in fact.
And we were supposed to help with the imple-
mentation. But that was a job in the N3 (Opera-
tions) shop then, and there had never been
a woman assigned to the N3 shop, and they
didn’t want to start with me. I ended up in this
other silly job that was a source of frustration. I
wanted to go back to an operational job, and
ended up going to the Bureau of Navy Person-
nel (BUPERS) —not exactly an operational job.
Bob Sheldon: Here in DC?
Pat Tracey: That’s right. It was in the Navy
Annex (about a mile south of the Pentagon). I
ran the placement function for graduate schools
and service colleges. I was the person who
wrote orders for people to go to schools. It
turned out to be a magnificent assignment. Go-
ing into Washington early in a military career
exposes you to people who are the up-and-
comers in their services and you get to meet
some of the rising stars at all different levels of
their careers. For a young woman in the Navy
at that time, who was not going to have an op-
portunity to serve at sea, that was an important
network-creating opportunity, because youwould
meet people who had longevity in their careers,
and you were going to be able to serve with
them again. It was pre-Goldwater-Nichols, so
the cycle typically was that officers would go
to Washington a couple of different times over
the course of their career, and youwould get into
a cycle where you were serving with people in a
cohort, who had been in Washington when you
were there and were in Washington when you
came back. For people who were going to serve
in odd places in the Navy, it was a way to build
a more mainstream set of relationships and an
awareness of how things fit together for the
Navy mission. Though I didn’t realize it at the
time, it turned out to be a really greatmove, from
the perspective of mapping out a career path
certainly, but more so for getting an under-
standing of how policy decisions are made at
the highest levels of the Navy. That assignment
was particularly good, because it exposed me
to what the Navy’s educational opportunities
were, and they were at the time not as widely
available for women officers as they were for
male officers. It was really hard for warfare-
qualified officers to fit school assignments in—
and it still is—but there were not many quotas
set aside for non-warfare-qualified officers.
But at least it gave me an exposure to what ed-
ucation opportunities were, and magically I
got orders to the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) to the operations research curriculum
out of that assignment.
Bob Sheldon: Before we go there, one of the
obstacles for young officers living in theDC area
is the high cost of living and the high cost of
rent. Was that a challenge for you?
Pat Tracey: Sure. It was for everybody
then, and I wasn’t one of the people who were
smart enough to buy in Reston, which was
a brand-new planned community at the time
that doubled or tripled in value while we
were assigned.
Bob Sheldon: Did you rent closer in or did
you buy?
Pat Tracey: Actually, we bought a condomin-
ium, which was very common in Hawaii but
a new concept in Washington, DC. We bought
a condominium down near Duke Street (in Alex-
andria) so it was only about 15–20 minutes from
the Navy Annex.
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Bob Sheldon: That’s a short commute by DC
standards. When you applied for NPS, did you
apply for a specific program?
Pat Tracey: Operations research. I started at
NPS in 1978.
Bob Sheldon: With all your math back-
ground, you probably didn’t have to take the
math refresher courses?
Pat Tracey: That’s right. I did not. Everybody
took calculus and statistics in their first quarter. I
was concentrating in systems analysis and then
did my thesis on tactical analysis. We learned, I
think, three different computer programming
languages. I remember APL, simulation . . . I
can’t remember what the third one was. I took
lots of statistics, probability, and through to sto-
chastic modeling.
Wayne Hughes: Pat, I was your NPS thesis
adviser. I thought it was a wonderful thesis, both
in concept and in execution. It was using a TI-59
programmable computer to figure out what the
probabilities of hits were, firing a missile from
a ship with some uncertainly of position at a tar-
get with some uncertainty of position. My ques-
tion is, ‘‘How did you come upon that thesis to
begin with?’’ You had no problem selling it to
me, and I loved the product. What inspired
you to choose it?
Pat Tracey:As I recall, you helped connectme
with people from Second Fleet and OPTEVFOR
in Norfolk, Virginia—the Operational Test and
Evaluation Force. It was a problem set they were
trying to deal with, about how to prioritize lines
of bearing in a search, and that was intriguing. It
had the element of building a computer-based
solution, and the handheld device was kind
of an interesting device—coming from telling
people they couldn’t have Wang computers to
actually being able to do something of some sub-
stance onwhat would now be amobile device. It
was intriguing to me. The categories of issues
that they were working at OPTEVFOR made
me think that was where I wanted to go as my
payback tour coming out of Monterey. It was
in line with the kinds of problems I thought I
wanted to work on in the Navy. So it fit that.
You had done a magnificent job in our course; I
think we were your first class on tactical analyt-
ics. And you were the one who had introduced
us to the OPTEVFOR folks. It was a nice connec-
tion that was made, because of where you had
taken people’s heads in terms of the very practi-
cal application of the kinds of tools and tech-
niques we were learning and how they could
help people in the field.
Wayne Hughes: That’s true. I was trying to
reintroduce more on the fleet and on tactical
analysis. The irony here is this was such a fleet-
oriented application and you weren’t allowed to
go aboard ship then.
Pat Tracey: That’s right. But if you think
about it, it was not all that uncommon, al-
though not that well known, for lots of people
in my community to be doing work that was
pretty mission-relevant, because we’d end up
in assignments that warfare-qualified officers
couldn’t go to—they just couldn’t fit it in.
They’d end up taking people like me into those
kinds of roles, who did actually get to do some
things that were important for fleet support,
which was one of the things I think was exciting
about a Navy career at that time and did not ap-
pear to be replicated in the Air Force or Army. It
was much harder for women in the Air Force
and Army to have access to those kinds of
opportunities.
Wayne Hughes:AndOPTEVFORwas a great
place that needed all the help they could get
for practical applications. I used to be frustrated
that they’d gotten too statistical, whenwhat you
really needed was a blend of fleet practicality
and a little statistical theory.
Pat Tracey: Yes.
Wayne Hughes: I’m waiting with bated
breath to see if you got to go to OPTEVFOR, be-
cause I didn’t know how that worked out.
Pat Tracey: No, I didn’t get to go to OPTEV-
FOR. I went to OP-96, which wasn’t too shabby
a place to go to at the time. It was the systems
analysis part of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) staff. RADM Kollmorgen
was OP-96. VADM Holcomb was OP-090.
Wayne Hughes: I’m with you, Pat. Over the
years, the Director of OP-96 and its successors
has almost always been an outstanding leader
who understands how to use analysis effec-
tively and objectively. You carried those skills
with you for the rest of your career.
Pat Tracey: Exactly. I went there in 1980, and
the Navy’s analysis for the transition from the
Carter to the Reagan administration was run
out of OP-96. All of the analysis and what
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passed for analysis behind the 600-ship Navy
was done out of OP-96. It couldn’t have been
a better time for somebody like me to be ex-
posed to all of the major issues that the Navy
warfighter was facing. Ironically, I was typically
given responsibilities for programs that were
viewed as lower priority. My programs included
the military prepositioning ships, Tomahawk
cruise missiles, battleships—those probably
where the three big ones that became quite
meaningful in the actual 1980s and 1990s fleet
execution, and the military preposition ships
became one of the cores to the way the Navy
and the Marine Corps would deploy.
Wayne Hughes: I’mwith you all the way. You
were off and running.
Bob Sheldon: How did the Navy approach
those studies?
Pat Tracey: Typically in OPNAV, we would
partner with a supporting federally funded re-
search and development center (FFRDC). The
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) did a lot of
work with us. We did some work with RAND,
but CNA was most often the OP-96 go to re-
source. As the OPNAV staff members, we
would manage the study, and the analytics
would be done by a CNA team. We helped
frame the questions, what kinds of assumptions
we wanted to make, and we engaged in a very
interactive process, which was really wonder-
ful. It was not as common then as it was later
that you contracted for the study and the study
leader went away, and you’d get the product at
the end. On the contrary, these were very inter-
active opportunities. I ran an analysis on con-
ducting an amphibious landing in the Persian
Gulf, called the Cameo Study and my partner
was a CNA analyst. We were able to conduct
a shoot-look-shoot study where the initial as-
sumptions we were asked to use ended up not
making any sense, and we could modify those
in process and do the right kind of adaptation
to the tactics and techniques that the OP-06
(Plans, Policy, and Operations) folks thought
they actually wanted to use in that sort of
scenario. It was not common for the OPNAV
people to actually do the study, as it was to
sponsor work that was being done by CNA—
really different from the Air Force where you
had cadres of uniformed ops researchers actu-
ally doing work.
I did a piece of work while I was in that role
on the effects of inflation on the actual buying
power of the DoD. We needed the forecasted in-
flation rates, and I’d go up to this office on the
fifth deck of the Pentagon where there were
rows and rows of cubes filled with really smart
Air Force guys who were doing economic anal-
ysis for DoD. It was really impressive that they
could generate that many operations research
people all in one space, and that they were all
in uniform. They were commonly a source of
that sort of core large-scale macroeconomic
analysis, coming out of the Air Force Studies
and Analysis group there.
Bob Sheldon: Can you point to any particular
analysis where you informed a decision that
was made based on the analysis?
Pat Tracey: The Cameo Study actually was
underpinning themilitary preposition ship con-
cept: that you couldn’t get the resources there
fast enough, that you had to have the preposi-
tioned ships and you needed them to be at
sea. There weren’t choices for land-based prep-
ositioning in the Middle East, so you needed
them at sea—prerepositioned resources—to
get the force moved there fast enough. That
was one that actually underpinned the decision
to adopt multiple maritime prepositioning
ships.
Bob Sheldon:What was your view of the cal-
iber of the analysts and other folks in OP-96 and
CNA?
Pat Tracey: The crowd that was in OP-96
when I was there was uniformly impressive.
That was a really rich group of people who later
became the senior leaders in the Navy. The late
1970s, early 1980s were a real heyday for OR
graduates in the Navy, and OP-96 was one of
the places—it was probably ‘‘the’’ place to go
if you were a line officer or warfighter. If you
could only fit in one Washington tour, then
you’d go do that. Most of the O-6s became flags,
and in fact, all the way down to the O-4s who
were there when I was there became flag offi-
cers. It was a pretty impressive crowd.
We did everything. We had a two-part orga-
nization: one that did political-military analysis,
and the other did quantitative analysis around
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) used to pro-
duce a 15-year extended planning annex. You
did the five-year plan, then 15 years out—what
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were the forecasted force levels and capabilities,
and what were the investments likely to have
to be, which is why the forecasts of inflationary
impacts on purchasing power mattered. I was
in a particularly great shop, because I was
with some folks who brought analytic focus to
political-military issues different from that of
OP-06, which is the political-military agency,
now N3/5 in OPNAV. We had a quantitative-
based political-military view and a policy-based
political-military view that was fed to the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO). It was really kind of
an interesting approach to feeding the executive-
level thinking in OPNAV. It doesn’t get done
quite that way anymore. But I thought that was
a pretty powerful opportunity.
Roger Barnett was my boss in that shop.
Roger is now at the War College. He’s an ex-
tensive writer on maritime policy and maritime
capabilities. I was fortunate to be mentored
by Wayne Hughes, a deep quantitative thinker,
and by Roger Barnett, a clear-eyed qualita-
tive thinker. Two really powerful influencers
on how to think about Navy power and why it
matters.
Bob Sheldon:Had you kept your same condo
there in Alexandria?
Pat Tracey: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: Was that a three-year tour?
Pat Tracey: No, it was 1980 to 1982.
Bob Sheldon: What did you look for next?
Pat Tracey: I was screened for executive offi-
cer (XO) coming from there. I went to my exec-
utive officer tour at Navy Recruiting District
Buffalo. Women had been allowed to fill XO
and commanding officer (CO) slots beginning
in the middle of my BUPERS tour. So about
1976–1977, the first women went into those
tours. Recruiting was the most common oppor-
tunity for us. That was my second personnel-
related assignment.
Bob Sheldon: How was that?
Pat Tracey: It was a hard time to recruit. I
was in Buffalo from 1982 to 1984. The last of
the steel mills was closing down in Buffalo,
but it is such a family-oriented part of the state
that these young men were not interested in go-
ing into the Navy, because they needed jobs that
were going to keep them close to home. It was
really hard to recruit from that perspective.
The flight to the southwest had been underway
for probably six years, and theNavy hadmissed
entirely that that was what was happening.
The goaling analyses that were done out of
Washington, DC, had the goals misaligned rela-
tive to where the high school graduate popula-
tion was shifting. They were goaling based on
the sizes of the historic populations, not on the
sizes of the current recruit-eligible population.
They had the goals in the wrong places in the
country. I think it took another three or four
years to actually flip the goaling models around
so they were targeting the right population.
That was a function of not having very strong
modeling and analysis capabilities that could
turn work quickly inside of the Navy Recruiting
Command. That was an interesting time to be
there, because of the dynamics of the population
and then what was happening for Recruiting
Command—not really being able to keep pace
with the rate at which the economics were
changing in the country and how they were
driving targeting.
Bob Sheldon: Buffalo got a lot more snow
than New York City. Did you have a good snow
shovel?
Pat Tracey: I lived in this great place. I lived
about three blocks from the shores of Lake Erie
in a house that had been turned into apart-
ments. I had a gorgeous apartment withinwalk-
ing distance of where I worked. But the lake
effect snowstorms in Buffalo were so weird. I
was able to walk to work. I would not know that
the people who were working for me were just
a few miles further inland with piles of snow
and couldn’t get to work at all. On the first Fri-
day of the first November that I was there, we
had a storm that came up all of a sudden, and
at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, it got really dark
out. There was lightning and wind blowing
and ice on the sidewalk. And the wind was
blowing so strongly, I couldn’t make forward
progress down the street unless Iwalked behind
someone else. That was my first introduction to
Buffalo weather. It was that way periodically
throughout the time that I was there. On April
18, we had switched to whites (Navy’s summer
service uniform). My recruiters were out on the
road in whites and it snowed on April 18, and
they looked ridiculous climbing through the
snowdrifts in their summer white uniforms.
Women didn’t have slack uniforms then. Sailors
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didn’t have anything other than their pea coats
then. The uniform was just completely inappro-
priate for the kinds of workwewere asking peo-
ple to do in that assignment, so it was a good
learning experience as a midgrade officer on
what kinds of things we put sailors through.
Wayne Hughes: I have a comment about Buf-
falo. For reasons you don’t need to know, I spent
a lot of time near New Buffalo, Michigan, which
is directly east from Chicago, on the east side of
LakeMichigan. Andwe had the same lake effect
there that Buffalo, New York, is so famous for.
Pat Tracey: Yes. I think every city that’s
around the lake has the potential for that kind
of an effect. I actually really liked it there. If
my husband, Rick Metzer, had been able to find
work there, we might have left the Navy there,
because we really liked it. He would fly in on
a Friday night, and we would try to get down-
town to go to our favorite restaurant, and we
would make it about half the time before the
kitchen was closed, and the rest of the time they
would open the kitchen back up for us, because
we only ordered one thing while we were there.
Theywould fix that for us, becausewewere reg-
ular patrons. It was a really lovely town. It was
quite nice.
Our recruiting territory ranged from Erie,
Pennsylvania, all the way across to Watertown,
New York. It was a huge swath of the snow-
belt country. In fact, we wouldn’t allow the
skipper to go to Watertown from probably mid-
November until March or April, because the
thruway is completely exposed there, and there’s
nothing on that road. If you got into any kind of
mechanical or weather problem, you might be
days before anybody found you. So it was kind
of interesting.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to from
there?
Pat Tracey: From recruiting duty, I went back
to OPNAV. I went back to what was then OP-91;
OP-96 had been recoded as OP-91. I went back
to be the manpower analyst at OP-91 when
RADM Grant Sharp was OP-91 and Admiral
Trost (later CNO) was OP-090.
Bob Sheldon: What were the manpower is-
sues at the time?
Pat Tracey: How do you grow to a 600-ship
Navy. We were coming out of a time when peo-
plewere spending nine to 12months at sea—not
in a sea duty status but actually deployed at sea.
And recruiting and retention were truly chal-
lenged to hold the current force. You may re-
member the beers, the Secretary of Defense
(SecDef) authorizing beer to be served on carriers
that were on prolonged deployments in the Per-
sian Gulf. So, we looked for the first time at the
widespread application of civilian outsourcing.
We looked at conversion of Navy-owned and
Navy-operated to contractor-operated, if not
contractor-owned, as a way to manage the rate
at which we had to grow military personnel. If
you could outsource some of the jobs to contrac-
tors, convert some of themilitary roles to govern-
ment civilian, then you would need fewer
sailors.
Bob Sheldon: Was that contentious?
Pat Tracey: Oh gosh, yes.
Bob Sheldon:What were the issues they were
arguing most intensely about?
Pat Tracey: If you think about it, in the 1980s
the notion that some categories of work related
to defense should be done by civilians or con-
tractors was still a pretty controversial idea.
Most of the work that was targeted was work
where the civilian workers were unionized, so
they were jobs that mattered a lot to both the
unions and to the local community. And the lo-
cal community saw risks that the work would
be awarded to people who came from outside
the community. The government required avery
rigorous cost-benefit analysis under rules re-
ferred to as A-76 before a government function
could be outsourced. Most A-76 contractors
ran under a set of expectations that they would
hire the government workers who were dis-
placed, so you would run for some period of
time with almost 100 percent of the government
civilian workforce as your workforce, and then
you could take economies over time. That was
part of the approach to managing both the im-
pact on the workforce and the politics of it. It
was a very controversial process, and one that
generated great congressional upheaval.
I don’t recall that we had done a Base Re-
alignment and Closure (BRAC) in my time—up
until that point in time—but outsourcing had
that sort of deep-seated congressional response.
It needed to be job neutral, so no jobs left the
community. The five southeastern states created
a pact among themselves that the US Navy was
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not allowed to remove more than X number of
positions from those five states without con-
gressional approval. And those rules were still
in place way into the 1990s, as a response to
some of the big changes the Navy wanted to
make in those geographic areas.
But we had an opportunity to model what
the size of the uniformed force needed to be to
sustain a sea duty rotation pattern that let peo-
ple have a predictable amount of time at sea
and a predictable amount of time in a shore-
duty assignment. It introduced the Navy’s
PERSTEMPO-OPTEMPOmetrics that governed
these times. Those concepts all started to take
hold.
The analysis underlying what those policy
implications would be in terms of how big the
military workforce had to be to have enough
people to be able to maintain those kinds of ro-
tations, and then flowed into what the number
of government civilians could be, and then
how much room there was to do A-76 work.
In the mid-1980s, there were some first at-
tempts at what were the categories of roles that
could not be contracted. Interestingly, in the
1990s those analyses became a lot fuzzier, and
people spent a lot less rigorous attention to
whether there were actions required of the job
ashore that might be actions that you only
wanted people subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) to be allowed to take.
That was the line of reasoning in the 1980s; that
sort of rigor disappeared in the 1990s, and I
think has created problems for us in 2000s.
Jerry Brown: I guess I feel duty bound to ask
you, as a graduate of our program at NPS, to
think back about the linear programming, the
statistics, the stochastic processes, and Wayne’s
course, and so forth. And with the perspective
of a payback tour to, of all places, OP-96. Good
heavens, that’s the perfect place. But talking
about your career, you used the phrase ‘‘fram-
ing the problem’’ and you also used the term
‘‘modeling the problem.’’ Can you share with
us what you thought was themost effective part
of your education in Monterey? What stayed
with you? Or what paid back the most?
Pat Tracey: Great question. I think a couple
of things were most impactful. We took a data
analysis course that Professor Read taught.
And his whole focus in that course was that it
was of value to just play with the data some-
times, just get your hands into the data, just
see what the data suggests to you, in terms of
patterns or anomalies and what have you. That
sometimes jumping inwith a specificmindset of
what the questions are that are going to be an-
swered by the data can keep you from seeing
what’s really important in the data. And that
played out in spades for me.
I went back to OPNAV in 1988 and did the
enlisted strength planning job for the Navy in
OP-01 (manpower, personnel, and training). I
did the planning for how many people to re-
cruit, how many people to retain, how many
people to promote, and so forth. It was a $16 bil-
lion budget for which we did the planning. We
had done a forecast of how many people were
going to retire, and based it on the historic work
that we had always used to do that. And we
were way off on the number that actually re-
tired. The retention of people from their 20th
year of service to their 21st year of service in
the enlisted force was dramatically different
from anything we had seen historically.
I remember spending three weekends in
a row just pouring over this data, and it was
purely by chance at one point that I realized that
I was looking at a phenomenon that had to do
with a surge in recruiting in the Vietnam era.
We were looking at the first of a series of very
large cohorts who joined the Navy from 1968
to the early 1970s. And they would be followed
by the first of the all-volunteer force recruits
who would begin to hit 20 years of service
within the next four years. So it was likely that
our assumptions about annual retirement losses
would need to be reevaluated. And it did turn
out to be a pattern that therewould be a gigantic
drop-off in service retention after 20 years of ser-
vice as people qualified for their retirement, and
that many of the folks would leave. I had looked
at that data by every conventional way that we
did that analysis for weeks on end—and Profes-
sor Read’s coaching actually turned out to be
right. Just let the data speak for itself for a while,
and maybe you’ll see something. It took sorting
and merging the data in a lot of different ways
before that particular pattern became obvious.
You could think that if I’d thought about
some of the underlying behaviors, that might
have been an obvious question to have asked,
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but that was an ‘‘aha moment.’’ We realized we
needed to improve our ability to access and use
longitudinal data for sizing personnel deci-
sions. We recognized that retention behavior re-
flects the cumulative experiences the cohort
shares as well as the specific events occurring
when the policy decisions are being made.
Letting the data speak for itself, and maybe
not always going in sure that you know that the
computation is going to tell you what you need
toknow, and so forth, . . . I think thatwasone thing.
Taking the time to frame the problem and
get the question right. Often you ask the wrong
question. That just happened in a session I was
in today, inside the business I’m in right now.
Someone framed an objective as accelerating
the outcome of a particular action in order to
do X, when in fact what we’re trying to do is
to accelerate X in order to achieve that outcome.
They had framed what the objective was—just
backward. So the actions they were proposing
to take were going to create tremendous tur-
moil, and actually have no impact on what it
was we were trying to get done. In some cases,
this had the opposite impact of what we’re try-
ing to get done.
Having the discipline about whether you’re
asking the right question or asking the question
right . . . both of those dimensions matter.
For me, the opportunity to go into the NPS
curriculum for an extended period of time,
where you’re not in a role where you’re compet-
ing directly with people for whatever the next
job assignment is, was an opportunity to coa-
lesce everything I had experienced before that,
understand a lot more clearly what I’d done
in the Navy and why it mattered—or didn’t
matter—to the Navy, and to be clearer about
what I wanted to do next.
I had two different opportunities like that in
my career: one at NPS and one in the Strategic
Studies Group (SSG). The NPS opportunity
came between Lieutenant and Lieutenant Com-
mander and the Strategic Studies Group came
between captain and flag officer. When I was
fortunate to participate in the SSG, it was a sem-
inar program at the Navy War College aimed at
introducing a small group of captains and colo-
nels in the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine
Corps to the sorts of open-ended questions they
will be expected to address in future executive
roles. It was great training in how to formulate
a policy point of view based on often fuzzy data,
and defend it among a group of peers where the
chain of command is what drives the decision.
Our assigned topic was about how the Navy
would be able to continue to exercise US influ-
ence in the post-Cold War era. I’m convinced,
and have campaigned with Mike Mullen when
he was the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Resources, Requirements and Assessments
(N8) and later when he was Vice CNO (VCNO),
CNO, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) about the fact that giving people, espe-
cially those in military roles, the opportunity
to step back for a measured period of time and
assess what they’ve already done and what it
means, how it fits in the context of the world
they’re going to have to influence, and doing
that more than once in their careers matters. It
does make you better prepared for what you’re
ultimately going to do, because at some point it
becomes your job to shape the future, not just to
react to it. And giving people the opportunity to
see howwhat they did fit into a bigger context, I
think, matters a lot. And that may have been the
most powerful thing I took away fromMonterey,
realizing that was almost more valuable to me
than the specifics of the education. I loved the
math and I loved the science, but it was the op-
portunity to see how the questions the Navy
had been asking me to work on were actually il-
luminated by various kinds of tools and tech-
niques, and why it was important to be able to
have that illumination, so that you could have
a bigger picture answer to the experience. I don’t
know that that would have been as clear to me
had I not had the opportunity to go directly from
Monterey to OP-96, to go directly from the aca-
demic world into a place that really had to have
that kind of an opportunity to use data to inform
pretty gigantic decisions.
Longanswer, but this is an important question.
Jerry Brown: That’s a great answer. First of
all, let me assure you that Bob Read will hear
about this. Bob is retired but he comes in to
work a couple times a week. And all Mike
Mullen had to say about Bob Read was he was
a devil of a pickup basketball player, and Mike
was a great player too. In his interview, Mike
also used the same terms you used: learning to
frame the problem is key. These days, in Bob’s
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lineage, we now have big data and analytics as
a concentration in the OR program.We’ve grav-
itated toward that. That long answer of yours
couldn’t have beenmore spot on. You are clearly
not only someone who was in charge of educa-
tion and training, you also know the difference
between the two.
Pat Tracey: Yes. Big data analytics—you
know, I work for Hewlett Packard now, and
big data analytics is one of the core areas that
big IT companies want to be known in. HP ac-
quired companies a few years back that had re-
ally powerful tools for managing large amounts
of data, both structured and unstructured. It is
a bit frustrating to me that the end of the busi-
ness that my company is in is the mechanics of
the tools, and it’s really hard to get people to re-
alize that if you’re a user, you don’t outsource
that part of what you do.
You need the tool to be a tool that can help
you ask the question that’s important to ask
right now—not ask a set of canned questions.
And, especially today, you don’t want to have
to be going to somebody else to frame up the
question and help you get answers out of the
data. A company that HP does some interesting
work for (not in my shop in HP) has allowed us
to generate big data for them, but we are not
allowed to touch the big data. And when you
know what the business is that they’re in, you
can understand, because their whole competi-
tive advantage comes from touching that data.
It is the sort of thing that Wayne and Professor
Read brought out in the curriculum there at
NPS, that you just let the data speak for itself
sometimes. There’s stuff here that you’re not
seeing—it’s so powerful. And here in HP, to be
on the tool end of the business, and not on the
outcomes end of the business, is frustrating.
Jerry Brown: I’ll share a story with you. I was
put in charge of buying a couple of mainframe
computers for NPS at the worst possible time,
which aligns with your Hawaii tour. And in or-
der to apply for permission to use the money,
we had to use a Wang word processor, but
weren’t permitted to buy a Wang word proces-
sor. So I travelled to Washington 40 times in
one year to borrow overnight their Wang word
processor from the people who were requiring
that we use it. This cost a lot more than a Wang
processor. But, we prevailed.
I’d like to askwhat advice you have now for
junior officers, especially up-and-coming O-3s
of both genders, of all warfare specialties, in
terms of postgraduate education. They now
have a number of options available to them, in-
cluding at Monterey, we have a business degree
now, we have OR, we have systems analysis,
systems engineering, space systems, antisub-
marine warfare, etc. Career-wise and person-
ally, what advice do you have—with in excess
of 30 years of exposure, and longitudinal expo-
sure to career paths?
Pat Tracey: I may not be right in this, but
when I was Chief of Naval Education and Train-
ing (CNET), I thought that Monterey had devel-
oped a set of programs that were OR-basedwith
some specific focus. The space operations to me
was an OR-based education, but with an em-
phasis in space. I think that you’ve done a couple
of others that I could’ve enumerated at the
time, but I can’t now. But it seemed to me, first
of all, that OR is a signature program for NPS,
and I think that NPS is still recognized globally
as a place where that’s a uniquely powerful
program.
To me, if you could only do this once, it was
the major you would choose. If your career is
clearly defined enough that you know youwant
to do OR with a special emphasis in space, or
OR with a special emphasis in special opera-
tions, or what have you, then those make sense
to me. But the subject areas that are covered in
anOR program are fundamental to understand-
ing hard problems, framing up alternative solu-
tions, and understanding how to compare and
contrast them.
What I thought was particularly useful was
how to present information in a way that you
can help other people not have to go through
the arithmetic with you, but so that they can ac-
tually get to a conclusion based on some logical
set of analyses. Those are just core capabilities
you have to have to succeed in any sort of a lead-
ership role. Those are just fundamental.
I would suggest OR. For people who have
no technical inclination, I thought that NPS’s
National Security Affairs program—the one
that NPS offered; not the one the War College
offered—was a similar sort of foundational
course. If you’re a nonquantitative policy-based
person, this is a way to get your head around
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how policy affects outcomes. Those are two sets
of really core capabilities that especially most
senior leaders have to have. How do you gather
insights from information, and how do you un-
derstand what the outcomes are going to be,
based on policies that are embraced? I think that
would be my advice.
More people can handle quantitative courses
than think they can, so I would suggest that in
a service as technical as theNavy is,more people
taking an operations research path would be my
suggestion. But for people who love politics and
policy, the National Security Affairs was a simi-
lar fundamental program.
Jerry Brown: I think maybe one of the OR-
centric programs that is now coming back into
fashion is antisubmarine warfare.
Pat Tracey: There you go. That’s the other
one. You had electronic warfare as well when I
was there. I think there were a set of programs
that over time were helpful—focused applica-
tions of OR. I thought that was a smart move.
Jerry Brown: One other class that we’ve
added since you graduated we informally call
‘‘Warfare with Excel.’’ We teach these folks
how to be PowerPoint and Excel warriors, be-
cause it’s a necessary skill once they leave us.
You were really lucky to be in OP-96, which is
nowN-81, the Assessments Division of OPNAV.
Every two years, N-81 does an OR curriculum
review here to make sure we at NPS are aligned
with their needs and what they believe the
Navy needs.
Tome, what’s remarkable about N-81 is that
the senior leadership really lets the junior offi-
cers loose. Once they gain the trust of senior
leadership, these junior officers are sent off to
brief extremely senior policy types.
I just had a chance tomeetwith quite a num-
ber at our annual MORS Symposium at Quan-
tico last week, and at one point I had 40 years’
worth of students arrayed around in a discus-
sion, all of whom had been A-6 pilots before
they became ORs. Their war stories in N-81
were really impressive to me.
Pat Tracey: I think this is still true. N-81 was
in full throttle when I was in my last assignment
in the Navy as the Director, Navy Staff (DNS).
Certainly in OP-96 and then OP-91 and the
two tours I served there, the junior officers
(JOs) actually picked the agenda. It’s even more
empowering than just that you get to talk to
pretty senior people about some pretty weighty
stuff. You actually help set the agenda for those
folks. You know you have to convince the lead-
ership that those are the right issues, but it’s re-
ally the junior officers who are expected to suss
out of the programs and budgets, what are the
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed, and
what are the next big things that are beingmissed
by the programmers that need to be put on the
plate. It was a very empowering assignment,
even when I was in OP-96; but it’s even more
so today, because the staff is so much smaller
now than it was when I was there.
Jerry Brown: You’ll be pleased to know that
another trick we’ve come up with is snagging
a number of the senior experienced N-81 uni-
forms back to Monterey as assistant and associ-
ate military professors. Boy do we learn from
them.
Pat Tracey: That’s great. I think the contrast
between the program at Monterey and the OP-
96 andN-81 experience is that because it’s an ac-
ademic environment, you tend to think about
the problem sets that you’re going to deal with
as being sort of closed problem sets; whereas
in N-81, some questions are never going to be
answered. You’re just going to advance the un-
derstanding, and you’re going to use different
approaches to try to get to a clearer insight.
But you have to do it in a closed timeline, which
is what is so bizarre because you have to pro-
duce at a rate that can shape the program bud-
get process that you’re trying to influence as
you go forward.
There is I think some great power in being
able to bring people from that real-world expe-
rience that Wayne talked about at OPTEVFOR.
The different ways in which analysis gets ap-
plied in the real world and inDoD and the paces
at which that has to be done, because you can’t
wait for the perfect data set—you’re going to
have to use what’s available to you—the leaps
of faith you may have to make based on what
you hope is well-informed intuition, because
there isn’t data available to do the next step in
what you would want to do, and what have
you.
All of those real-world experiences are very
powerful for somebody who’s still in an aca-
demic program to understand that it’s never
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going to be as nearly perfect as it feels like it is
when you’re in school.
Bob Sheldon: The role of women in the mili-
tary has changed a lot since you joined theNavy
in 1970. How have you seen that evolve?
Pat Tracey: Women were brought into the
service academies in 1976.
Bob Sheldon: Did you see a difference when
they started coming into the fleet?
Pat Tracey: I lived through probably three
major waves of changes in the roles of women
in the Navy. Women started going to the service
academies in 1975–1976. OCS opened up for
women in 1973. ROTC in about the same 1975
time frame. Commanding officer/executive
officer (CO/XO) ashore opened up for Navy
women in 1975–1976. The first nonmedical
women went to sea on the USS Sanctuary in
the 1970s. The fleet support ships opened up
for women in the late 1970s—1979–1980—
timeframe. The USS Sanctuary was, while
I was at the Bureau—1975–1976—a single-
ship experiment, completed. That ship was
actually decommissioned and women didn’t
go to sea again for another couple of years.
And then women were assigned to sea
duty on fleet support ships that did not travel
with battle groups. Tenders—ships would ren-
dezvous with the tenders for repair at sea work
to be done. Big ships—they were World War II
era ships, with 1,500 sailors on a ship. Gigantic.
Very manual, everything on the ship was done
by throwing people at it, so it was a verymanual
process. Women were on those ships in the
1970s.
That did not go very well at all. I have lots of
perspective as to what didn’t go well, and why
did they not go well.
From a career management point of view
for officers, there was no way to get from XO
of a tender to CO of anything, because the
captain of a tender was an O-6, and you had
to have had command as a commander to be-
come an O-6 CO of a tender. And the women
couldn’t get there at all. O-5 commands were
in ships that traveled with the battle groups, ei-
ther warships themselves or the logistics ships
that went with the battle group. Also, at that
time logistics aircraft were the only aircraft
open for women—even P-3s were not open
for women.
In the middle 1980s, the battleforce logistics
ships were opened up for women. We took
women who had been on the tenders and
assigned them to command Cimarron class
oilers—I think they were new ships then—a
new class of ships assigned for women who’d
never even served in those ships.
In the 1990s then—after ‘‘Tailhook’’—the
Navy was directed to open up combat aircraft
and combat warships.
The surface Navy did a magnificent job of
planning that for success of the program this
time around. They adopted a set of assignment
processes to be sure that women officers were
going to be trained up through the right sets
of preparatory experiences, so that by the time
they were eligible to command combat ships,
they’d actually had the right kinds of experi-
ences. Kevin Green was the surface detailer
when those decisions weremade. He did awon-
derful job managing for the success of every-
body who was in the program, and it has
worked.
The submarine force did not assign women
to submarines until the 2000s.When Iwas doing
the enlisted career planning in the late 1980s,
they were already beginning a process to figure
out how to get women into the nuclear power
schools for surface ships, so that they would
have a cadre of women who were proven in nu-
clear power, which was the most important
thing for submarines: to be proven in nuclear
power. Then when they were ready, they would
be able to open up submarines with a cadre of
women who had already proven themselves in
the engineering. That was important for subma-
rines. They’ve done that and been successful
at it.
I saw three big waves of changes over my
time.
In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, to some ex-
tent, and certainly from 2001 on, women served
in increasingly exposed positions in combat in
every service.
In the mid-1990s when I was working for
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
we traveled to visit troops in the Balkans. And
it was really clear that no matter what we were
saying, womenwhowere leading logistics units
in peacekeeping operations were as exposed as
anybodywas. The last unit to come out of one of
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the locations that we visited was going to be the
logistics unit; the commander was a woman, an
Army O-6. The life was really different from
what you would’ve expected it to be just look-
ing at the pure personnel policy statements.
As we started doing peacekeeping opera-
tions globally in the late 1990s, all of the as-
sumptions about what was safe and what was
not safe, what was combat and what was not
combat, really fell apart.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to your Pentagon
assignment in the late 1980s, what was your
transition there?
Pat Tracey: I did Buffalo, then went back to
OP-91, thenwent to command at theNavy Tech-
nical Training Center in San Francisco. I ran the
Damage Control and Fire Fighting School in the
middle of San Francisco Bay for 18 months. It
was an ‘‘A’’ school, training the entry-level reli-
gious professionals, hull maintenance techni-
cians, and damage control men. You couldn’t
have a wider variety of people than that.
And then it was a fleet training center for
firefighting and damage control training, and
we did ‘‘C’’ school training for the people who
maintained elevators on ships.
It was the only school in the CNET inven-
tory that ran that sort of a mix of training,
both institutional and fleet—individual and
team training. It was an unusual mix of
opportunities.
We did mass conflagration training for fire-
fighting. I took command about a year after the
missile strike on a US frigate in the Gulf, and we
had to do mass conflagration training as one of
the after-actions from that strike. The first at-
tempt at this training at the firefighting school
was an interesting experience. These buildings
were designed for live firefighting. They were
designed for the roof to lift up in the heat and
come back down again. In my great good for-
tune, it lifted up and came down at an angle.
Luckilywe didn’t kill anybody, but it was an op-
portunity to test some of these theories about
what you could dowithmixing contractor, civil-
ian, and military personnel.
I was able to convince my local public
works officer to let me put some sailors on with
his civilians and their contractor support so that
we could get the repairs done faster at a much
lower price. We had convinced ourselves in
OPNAV that you couldn’t do that—you
couldn’t make that work—that sailors could
not be put into a position where they were tak-
ing direction from a government civilian. That
turned out to be exactly wrong. So we did some
interesting pioneering, some things to recover
from a horrible mistake there.
I was there for about 18 months. Then I
came back to OPNAV—to OP-01. The Chief of
Naval Personnel (CNP) at the time wanted to
bring more senior women back into policymak-
ing roles. I got ripped out of command early to
come back to fill a role as the advisor on
women’s assignments—a role I absolutely did
not want. I thought it was important to continue
to work on mainstreaming women’s career
planning rather than continuing to focus on
differences.
Happily, I hadn’t been there a week before
they gave me the enlisted planner role instead.
We did strength planning for the last increment
of growth to achieve the 600-ship Navy.
And before that budget was approved, the
Soviet Union collapsed, and we were downsiz-
ing the Navy, and had to downsize in pretty
rapid fashion. That again was an opportunity
to use the orderly thinking of how to do this.
We convinced the Navy that you had to tell us
how big the fleet was going to be; then it was
possible to figure out how many people it was
going to take, and the mix of military, civilians
and contractors we needed, and then we could
figure out how to get from where we were to
that number of people.
But we suggested we should build a plan
that allowed for a resurgent Russia. This meant
we needed to hold senior leaders, and we
needed to get the entry-level number to be the
right sustaining number for the size of the force
we intended to keep for the long term. And we
needed to manage the reductions in the mid-
career force. With this sort of profile, we could
make up for any shortfalls if in fact we had to re-
cover fast. That was an exciting opportunity.
Mike Boorda was the CNP. One of things
that happens in Washington is that the budget
process tends to drive what you’re doing, and
you sometimes let disconnected decisions get
made. Admiral Boorda was able to stay above
that. He didn’t let a financially driven decision
make for a disconnected policy outcome. He’d
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go see the CNO and make the dots get recon-
nected again. His was an impressive demon-
stration of what the responsibility is of people
who are at that level in OPNAV. And here we
had the three-star functional leader of a core
function. If you don’t speak up at the right time,
you’re going to break that function, and it will
stay broken because nobody can fix it but you.
I learned a lot from him in that role. I remember
once telling him that the BUPERS manual did
not allow us to do ‘‘X’’ and he said to me, ‘‘I
know that that’s what that manual says. But
guess who wrote that manual? And if we can
figure out the right thing to do, then we’re going
to do the right thing. And as long as it’s not ille-
gal, we’re going to do the right thing.’’
There were lots of things about him that
were hard to deal with, but it was an impressive
example of what very senior executive leader-
ship responsibilities are, and what decisions
only the senior executives should be making.
It was hard at first to realize why he was in-
truding into some things which seem really
pretty tactical, but when you stood back, you re-
alized that they were going to set the stage for
the future.
In ordinary times, they would have been
tactical decisions, but we’re about to make
a really significant change to the force. He
was judging what the right things were for
him to be involved in. Sometimes you see busi-
ness leaders recognize that their roles change
in times of big strategic or transformational
shifts and sometimes they don’t make the shift
when they should. He was impressive. I was in
that assignment from 1988 to 1990, and then I
took command of the Naval Station in Long
Beach, California.
I did a two-year tour in command of Long
Beach beginning about a week after Desert
Shield began. We had 11 ships deployed to Des-
ert Shield andDesert Storm for the first year that
I was there. We did the evacuation of Subic (US
Naval Base Subic Bay) and then sent people
back to Subic only to evacuate them again when
we closed the bases there permanently. We did
that sort of noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO) support for overseas operations.
We were the second largest homeport in the
Pacific Fleet. We had the USS Prairie as a home-
ported ship, a tender that was then the oldest
operating ship in the Navy. We had two battle-
ships and two Aegis cruisers, all homeported.
We had this huge range of ships to support.
Long Beach is about two hours north of San
Diego. It was not the most desired West Coast
homeport. On weekends, the COs and XOs of
many of our ships would go home to San Diego,
so I would inherit all their crews in Long Beach.
That was kind of interesting.
We were there for the Rodney King riots,
which was an opportunity to understand the
support for domestic operations under the
1990s rules. They’re different today. We opened
up our bachelor officer quarters (BOQ) for the
families of deployed sailors who lived in places
in Long Beach and Los Angeles that were on
fire. We brought them onto the base so they
had a place to hunker down for a few days, at
least.
I left there and went to the Strategic Studies
Group (SSG) inNewport, Rhode Island for a year.
Our subject was how the US would exercise in-
fluence in a post-Soviet world. The curriculum
then was very different from the curriculum that
has just ended.
It was very much of a policy-based focus. It
was a curriculum intended for peoplewhowere
considered to be eligible to become flag officers,
to expose them to the bigger-than-Navy rela-
tionships that were important. We met with
think tanks and allied nations. We met with in-
dustry leaders who were important to the
Navy—Northrop and Lockheed, in particular.
But we got to understand what drove the think-
ing of people running businesses that made up
the industrial base for the Navy, and, of course,
for Navy and joint military leaders. I spent
a year doing that, and I was picked up for flag
coming out of that assignment.
I went to J-1 on the Joint Staff as my first as-
signment after SSG. I walked into that job in the
summer of 1993, and we stood up 11 Joint Task
Forces in the time that I was there, and never
stood one down during that whole time. One
of the largest operations was preparing for po-
tential invasion of Haiti.
I was on the phone at 6 o’clock on a Sunday
evening, trying to get contracts written through
the State Department for speakers of Haitian
Creole, which I understand is the hardest and
rarest form of Creole in the world. I remember
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getting message traffic from the CO of the USS
Nicholas telling me that ‘‘Seaman so-and-so de-
nies all knowledge of Haitian Creole, but here’s
his social security number. You can check him
out.’’
The job I took over had been focused on
manning the Joint Staff. I’d never done a person-
nel job in my life, so I didn’t know how to do
that. I did know how to do force planning, so
that was where we pivoted—to do force plan-
ning to allow us to stand up all the Joint Task
Forces. It was really a good exposure to what
were policies and rules that were designed
for a peacetime-going-to-wartime footing, and
didn’t actually bridge these less well-defined
operations.
You were assigning people into Joint Task
Forces outside of their units. Navy people were
going as individuals into Joint Task Forces
working ashore. Army guys knew how to oper-
ate in those environments, but Navy guys had
never been ashore and never carried a personal
weapon. It was a real exposure to how single-
threaded our policies were. They were all cen-
tered around the expectation of war with the
Soviets, and that was clearly not what we were
going to do. It turned out to be timely that we
had a chance to think through those things in
the years running up to 2001. Those were big
changes.
I went from there to Great Lakes and ran the
Naval Training Center (NTC) at Great Lakes,
which is the site of the Navy’s single boot camp,
and about 60 percent of the enlisted A School
training. I was there for a year and an hour.
Bob Sheldon: Why a year and an hour?
Pat Tracey: I was fortunate to be promoted to
three stars to relieve my boss at CNET in July,
a year after I took command at Great Lakes. I
served as CNET for two years. I was home-
ported in Pensacola, but with the responsibility
for all officer and enlisted individual training in
the Navy, and some role in a second hat for ed-
ucation. I was the resource sponsor for NPS
when I was in that job.
Wayne Hughes: It was my impression that
CNETwas staffed with people who understood
training but not education, and particularly not
graduate education. Was that your impression?
Pat Tracey: Maybe a little worse than that.
CNET was actually a budget holding activity.
CNET was populated primarily by O-6s who
had extensive warfighter experience, but they
were not going to make the cut for flag. It was
a place that was good for them to be able to fin-
ish up a 30-year career in an important role
shaping the future enlisted and officer force. It
was not by any means a throwaway job. The
people who were in those roles were important
thinkers about what the training environment
needed to be and what goodness looked like
for people who were coming through hard
kinds of programs, like aviation training and
so forth.
But the organization was built aroundman-
aging the budgets of all the schoolhouses, with
no real expectation that you would do anything
other than be sure that the money that surface
put into training went to surface schools, and
the money that aviation put into training went
to aviation schools. And I thought it was all green
money once it was assigned to me, and that the
job ought to be about how to get the most train-
ing out of that amount ofmoney for asmany dif-
ferent specialties as there actually were, and
looking for ways to reduce attrition and opti-
mize the learning experience.
In that job while I was there, I was exposed
to these wonderful technologies for learning,
and people who were on the Navy’s payroll. It
is actually pretty amazing, the spectrum of tal-
ent that the Navy had on their payroll that we
didn’t fully realizewehad—whowere adult learn-
ing scientists who could help.
I remember meeting a woman who had
taken a look at the Sonarman A School curricu-
lum in San Diego when ADM Vern Clark was
commanding Second Fleet. The admiral often
talks about discovering how many sailors we
were flunking out of Sonarman A School be-
cause they couldn’t do Boolean algebra, pure
Boolean algebra, when the actual job was to
translate sound into an understanding of what
is going on underwater. This woman created
a visualization of what was going on. When
you thought about it, you’re taking a kid who’s
just been through boot camp, doesn’t actually
know what a submarine is, and you’re going
to teach him Boolean algebra as a way to get
him to detect a submarine underwater, and
to tell you what the submarine’s activities
are. Adults actually learn better visually. This
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woman turned the training into an interactive
visualization of what was going on, and she
was able to reduce the training time and pro-
duce people out of A School who had the
proficiency of an eight-year fleet-experienced
sonarman. It was just remarkable what she
was able to do by just not marching down
the path we had marched for the last 40 years,
and actually applying computer-based tools
and techniques.
Wayne Hughes: It is frightening, because
when I was in CNET Support, I think the term
for those experts was educational specialists.
As an analyst, you would know that the work
of those educational specialists has a close rela-
tionship to operations analysis. In my time,
there was a great emphasis on trying to improve
the state of learning, and I’m glad to hear at least
you tried to nurture a return to that perspec-
tive. You’re not a budgeteer but getting quality
training.
Pat Tracey: I have to be quite fair here. I came
behind Tim Wright, who was the Seventh Fleet
Commander, who went to CNET and brought
with him a view of areas where Navy training
needed to be improved. He became very versed
in the power of training technologies, and he
was the one who started to open up all these
doors to people who were hidden away in labs
in the Navy and in universities that supported
the Navy, and so forth. He began to bring all
of those technologies to bear, and it was easy
just to follow on behind the doors that he had
opened up.
It took multiple CNETs to change the staff
from thinking that their job was to manage the
budgets. You domore thanmanage the budgets.
You had to break the boundaries between the
dollars to make the changes that we wanted to
make. It took multiple generations to get that
going.
But it is true that that staff is solely focused
on training; it has no education focus, and it still
has no education focus. And it struggles to
agree that there is a role for education in a mili-
tary. The staff is populated by people who are
very aware of how important the muscle mem-
ory sort of training is for the people we ask to do
difficult, demanding, and dangerous things un-
der highly stressful circumstances. And when
you are exposed to all of the work that the Navy
can do, any of the services do, in their training
organizations, it’s encouraging to realize that,
as a nation, we’ve built the ability to teach any-
one how to do anything for which they have the
physical capability to execute the function. We
can break down very complex tasks into their
component pieces, and we can make you repeat
the components over and over and over again
until you get them connected and they’re an au-
tomatic response for you. It’s really remarkable.
If you’re in an environment where you are not
able to be as selective about the people you re-
cruit, you need the ability to reliably produce
people ready to perform and the Navy’s train-
ing engine can do that.
Wayne Hughes: I hear you, Pat, and I think
that the skills of teaching training that you’re
describing are magnificent and powerful, but
they’re just different from the skills of doing
graduate education.
Pat Tracey: I used to articulate it as this train-
ing engine can teach youwhat to do, and how to
do it. And as you get your fleet experience and
you come back for your ‘‘C’’ school level train-
ing, you begin to understand why you do that,
and eventually, as a senior enlisted and mid-
grade officer, you’re able to discern what are
other ways to do this. And that’s the training en-
gine. That’s really powerful.
But the education is about how does it all fit
together? Why would you do those things?
How might you think about doing them differ-
ently? What are different outcomes that you
might be aspiring to? And you need both. You
certainly couldn’t go to war without a training
engine. But you could be amuch better war pre-
vention force if you invested in the education of
people at the right levels in their career paths.
I still say just that time out in a thought-
provoking environment to consolidate every-
thing that you’ve experienced anddrawmeaning
from it and draw expectations for what’s next for
you from it is invaluable to somebody who’s at
some point going to have to deal in massive un-
certainty. So I’m with you. And it was very very
hard to get the CNET organization to agree that
there were important differences in the two sets
of experiences.
Wayne Hughes: On a more personal basis, I
was thrilled that you made Vice Admiral. And
I thought, what a great capstone to a successful
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career, and then I found out you weren’t done
yet.
Bob Sheldon: Before we leave Pensacola, you
were assigned to some garden spots—Monterey
and Pensacola. Did you take up anywater activ-
ities like scuba?
Pat Tracey: Sailing and kayaking, if you can
believe that.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next assign-
ment after Pensacola?
Pat Tracey: I went back toWashington and to
OSD. I was theDeputyAssistant Secretary of De-
fense for Military Personnel Policy in OSD Per-
sonnel and Readiness. That was then the most
senior military person on the OSD staff. I was re-
sponsible for compensation policy, the big frame-
works for promotion policies, and personnel
policies that then get implemented by the ser-
vices. I arrived as we were campaigning for the
largest pay increase in the late 1990s. The Clinton
administration’s pay increases that actually be-
came the Bush administration’s pay increases.
The basic allowance for housing (BAH) had been
recomputed. You may not remember this, but
when I arrived there in 1998, the housing market
across the country was going wild.
And in places where we had bases—I vis-
itedAir Force bases in northern California—and
although we had set our BAH in a way that was
supposedly going to keep pace with the chang-
ing rates of housing, the prices were going up so
fast that airmen would have rented a home,
have a lease for the period of their assignment
there, and the owner would buy them out of
that lease because someone had driven up to
the front door and offered them somuchmoney
for the piece of property. It was just insane.
We had to redo the approach to computing
BAH. I have not kept track of this. It would be
interesting to understand whether it worked
the way it was designed to work when prices
went the other way. I don’t know what hap-
penedwith that. The approach to BAHhad been
championed by the Chiefs as being an opportu-
nity for enlisted people to own houses. Thatwas
an important principle that the people who
defended the nation had the right to participate in
the benefits of being a citizen of the nation. There
was some really good thinking—Rumsfeld called
it a social compact—among the Chiefs as to what
the obligations were to a force that was now
not a Soviet-era force, but a force that was then
asked to go do things, like peacekeeping in unex-
pected but dangerous places—that the demands
that were being placed on the force in the late
1990s were so different.
It was much easier for people to sign up to
go fight the Soviets and you could build a little
on World War II values, and maybe live with
some of the draft-era behaviors when the So-
viets were still around. But in the late 1990s, that
principal didn’t apply anymore. The Chiefs and
senior civilian leaders were very sensitive to the
fact that we had broken the compact of the all-
volunteer force by forcing people to leave in
the mid-1990s. We had built this magnificent ca-
reer force, and then we took away the choice of
whether they were going to make it a career or
not. So there was a lot going on. It was rather
an interesting manifestation of how the most-
senior leaders think about what their obliga-
tions are to the people that they’re leading. I
found that to be encouraging.
When I arrived, we had decided that we
couldn’t live with reform of the military retire-
ment that Congress had put in place in 1978. It
was called the REDUX retirement. We had
grandfathered for 20 years the 20-year retire-
ment; and on the 19th year and sixth month,
convinced the Congress that this was a terrible
plan and did away with it, when the effect of
it would have been to encourage people to serve
one more year to reach the value of their 20-year
retirement. What was clear in the late 1990s is
that people were living a lot longer. We should
be thinking about whether we actually wanted
to encourage people we’ve invested in to leave
the service after 20 years at age 40 and some-
times less.
But leaders became convinced the new pro-
gram would under-value the currently serving
force compared to their predecessors. It was
a great manifestation of how, in an organization
with asmuch history and continuity as the DoD,
sometimes the policy intent of a major change
sometimes can get lost—and deserves to be
refreshed and reevaluated over time.
We had never changed the recruiting mate-
rials, so we had continued to advertise a 20-year
retirement, and we had lost completely the con-
cepts that we wanted people to serve longer. We
wanted to reduce the strain on the front end of
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the force, by being able to keep people longer,
and encourage people to stay longer. And, in
fact, the life span had changed in such a way
that it was a reasonable thing to try to do. So
we had to rework how we planned to go about
encouraging people to serve longer where that
was appropriate.
I served in OSD for two years, then I was
asked to be the Director of the Navy Staff. That
had been a job filled by a captain or one-star
admiral. I was asked to come in as the first Navy
3-star, to be the chief of staff of the OPNAV staff
for the service chief. The Joint Staff, Army, and
Air Force staffs both filled this role at the 3-star
level. Admiral Clark, the CNO, had decided to
do the same. Admiral Clark wanted a process
that would integrate across the 3-stars in
OPNAV that was not driven by the N8, so that
he would not hear answers that only came from
the budget perspective. He wanted to hear the
warfighting capability answers first, and then
how to afford it second. That was what my job
was, to reorganize the governance process, so
that it would give him more of what he had
seen previously in OP-96. He valued that sort
of analysis—independent of cost—but with cost
as the independent variable.
First you look at what the capabilities were
that you needed to have andwhy, andwhywere
those the best choices, and then you would
work on the financials. He had a perspective
that, at the time that you become a 3-star, you
become responsible for very large functions in
the Navy, and only a very few of those roles
have direct warfighting responsibilities.
Most 3-star jobs are not warfighting jobs;
they’re running the business of the Navy. In
most cases, executives come from running the
warfighting missions in the Navy, where re-
sources to execute that mission are allocated al-
most on demand, to then being responsible for
sizing the future Navy or building the ships
and airplanes for the Navy, managing all the
money it takes to do that.
In many of those roles, the leader is respon-
sible for some sort of buying relationship with
the private sector. In our system at the time, noth-
ing prepared executives for those very different
responsibilities. The CNO was looking for ways
we could prepare senior military officers for the
sort of ‘‘run the business’’ roles that comprise
most of what they’re going to do. I was really in-
terested in that part of this because I had come
out of the business side of the Navy. And this
was an opportunity to help accelerate the busi-
ness knowledge of executives bringing deep
warfighting knowledge to roles with key re-
sponsibilities for shaping future Navy capabil-
ities. It was hard to say no to that job. That was
my last assignment.
Jerry Brown: You have had all the experience
I could ask for to answer the following question
that has botheredme for a long time.Whywon’t
our armed services let career officers do a job
they love and are good at doing for as long as
they want, while not necessarily anticipating
any additional promotion?Why, with a few rare
exceptions, do we have our ‘‘up or out’’ system?
I’ve met allied uniformed experts who are the
equivalent of O-3s and have been in the same
billet for decades. Mind you, I’m not talking
about offering tenure—this would have to be
based on service needs and excellent perfor-
mance. By the way, our current policy has
world-class, NPS-educated ORs leaving service
and becoming civilian consultants to the mili-
tary. The economics here don’t necessarilymake
sense, and there are qualitative differences in
what we can expect from uniforms, vice civil-
ians. How do you explain this policy?
Pat Tracey: The policy is a direct reflection of
the restrictions on the number of people permit-
ted in each grade from LCDR/major through
flag and general officer as set in law. The
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
(DOPMA) requires those limits and time in
grade minimums and maximums. The force
benefits from a continuous flow of new talent
and fresh perspectives, but there are a number
of downsides including the ones you mention.
The lack of flexibility in the law makes it very
difficult to respond to significant shifts in tech-
nology or the way work is done or strategic pri-
orities, such as have been occurring since the
mid-1990s. I have not been tracking this very
closely, but it sounds as if the CNO and others
are working on ways to gain the flexibility they
need to be sure that officers and enlisted leaders
have the right skills and the right experiences
for the future. The challenge will be that those
demands are likely to continue to evolve more
dynamically than they did during the Cold
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War when DOPMAwas established. With regard
to important special skills, like OR, the relaxa-
tion of restrictions on retirees being able to join
the civilian workforce has been one way to pro-
vide important flexibility. We need to continue
to look for ways to achieve the balance that
makes the most sense for conditions as they
continue to change.
Bob Sheldon: You occupied a lot of different
wings in the Pentagon during your career.
Pat Tracey: Yes. I spent half my career in the
Pentagon and I retired in 2004.
Bob Sheldon:What were your plans to do af-
ter retirement?
Pat Tracey: I wanted to do something that
was really different. I wanted to do something
like I ended up doing, so I’ve been very fortu-
nate in that.
I wanted to understand what it was like to
work in business. What makes you come to
work every day if you’re in business, if the ob-
jective is to increase the amount of money the
company is making. I wanted to understand
how people manage to do that every day and
feel good about themselves. And for the last
six years I was in the Navy, I was exposed to—in
a couple of different education experiences—
how business looks at DoD, what things busi-
ness looks at to make their decisions, and so
forth. So that was interesting to me. Could I do
that and prove myself? I was very fortunate
and ended up in my current role.
Jerry Brown: You mentioned shaping en-
listed and officer corps. I currently have a deep
concern, I think shared with a lot of folks, about
the United States and maintaining what you
might call our national identity. And I think that
the draft or some kind of the national service
would be extremely beneficial to maintaining
our national identity. You doubtless recall learn-
ing how to take orders, and give them, and how
organized military units are greater than any of
their parts. It seems remarkable to me that 18-
year-old females do not have to register for the
draft. But this appears to be a third rail politi-
cally. Do you have any opinion on that?
Pat Tracey: I fought for women to have to
register for the draft when I was in my OSD
job. I was unsuccessful and I am not sure how
widely it would be supported even now. But I
agree with your notion that we need some
way to remind each of us that the values on
which the United States were founded can be
lost and they demand effort from each of us to
sustain them. I do find it wonderful that people
of the Internet age, the millennials, are so will-
ing to just reach across boundaries. I find that
energizing, and I find it a fascinating question
how theywill organize theway they think about
the world. I hope that they embrace the things
that make us who we are, the things that make
uswhowewant to believewe are. Finding some
way to ensure that every individual grasps how
important it is to remain fully committed to
those, and to defend those at all costs, that’s re-
ally important to me. In my current role, I am
continually impressed by the fact that people
do seem—even the young oneswhomight seem
the most remote from patriotism—deeply com-
mitted to ensuring that the rights and style of
life that we live in the US are defended, that
they continue. The Digital Services Initiative
that the Obama administration began with a
call for people from Silicon Valley to come to
Washington and help move the government’s
initiatives in the ITarena down the road, surpris-
ingly has brought people from Silicon Valley,
from deep inside these companies where there
are what look like 12-year-old billionaires, to
Washington because they want to make a differ-
ence. So that’s a degree of patriotism thatmatters.
It’s people who want to make a difference in the
world. And that’s inside this generation that
doesn’t define itself by a nation’s boundaries.
Wayne Hughes: I have a comment for the
readers of Military Operations Research. Pat was
very nearly our first NPS president and I still
shed a tear over that. For one reason or another,
she was not able to come out here and be our
first president.
Pat, I know you said that Dan Oliver would
do a better job than you. He did a very fine job,
but if I had my way, you would have been our
first president.
Pat Tracey: Thank you. That’s still a regret I
have that that didn’t happen. I have said in
speeches—and it’s sincere—that the two years
I spent in Monterey were a defining moment
formy career. I chose to stay in theNavy because
I spent those two years at Monterey. It did open
up opportunities for me that would never
have been open under any other circumstance.
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It did prepare me in a way that I could not have
bettered for the kinds of jobs I had the opportu-
nity to fill. Tome, it is a crown jewel for the DoD,
and the fact that it continues to be threatened is
just troubling tome, and if I’d had a chance to be
the president, that would’ve been an opportu-
nity to try to campaignmore fully for it to thrive,
not just to survive.
Jerry Brown: Please let me repeat here a quo-
tation from one of your early remarks in this in-
terview: ‘‘I knew what I did not want to do: I
didn’t want to be a personnel officer; I did not
want to work in training; and I did not want
to work in an administrative role.’’
We can see that by the end of your Navy ca-
reer, your duties turned out very differently
than you anticipated, including serving every
role you initially thought you didn’t want to fill.
What irony. Can you please close your interview
with us with reminiscent advice to any Navy ju-
nior officer on how they might expect to mature
in a career, and how to foretell such transitions?
Are there good decisions that a junior officer
might make that would not otherwise appeal?
Pat Tracey: Probably four things:
Part of being a leader is being an intentional
follower. Gain as complete an understanding of
the desired outcome as you can and as thorough
an understanding of your role in achieving it,
and, especially, of how actions you and your
team take will affect the expectations of others
participating in the same operation. If you land
in an assignment you did not especially seek,
this is the way to make it matter for you.
There is always more to learn. Maybe more
now than ever. Certainly the Navy’s culture of
continuous training to ensure the difficult, de-
manding, and dangerous things become second
nature to performwith precision is as important
as ever. But the enemy wins when we become
too predictable, and when we don’t take the
time to understand his or her thinking. The
‘‘what’’ and the ‘‘how’’ of precise execution
come from training. How to put precise execu-
tion together to win comes with experience.
The ‘‘why’’ and the ‘‘why not’’ come from edu-
cation. Make time for it.
The specific subject matter that will be im-
portant for the Navy in 10 or 20 years is likely
to be different from the areas of education and
experience that have been important for your
current leaders. Look at the significance of cyber
operations and special operations today com-
pared to the time when today’s admirals were
junior officers. Plan your career and your educa-
tion to be ready to lead in the environment as it
keeps changing.
Life is short, and Navy life is even shorter.
Don’t be so focused on the uncertainty of your
future that you miss the joys and satisfactions
of the current moments—personal and profes-
sional. They will not come again.
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